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Sidhu

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION’S COLORBLIND PROTECTION OF CROSS BURNING IN FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE LEGITIMATES WHITE SUPREMACY
Kiran Sidhu*
INTRODUCTION
The notion that the Supreme Court has used, and continues to
use, the Constitution as an instrument to uphold White supremacy since
the inception of our nation is hardly a novel concept.1 The Court’s use
of colorblindness2 as a mechanism to maintain White racial privilege by
creating legal frameworks that make it increasingly difficult to prevent,
proscribe, or prosecute race-based violence is increasingly interrogated
and exposed.3 Indeed, it is through the Court’s treatment of race-based
claims in Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause cases that we
can most clearly see the employment of colorblindness as a vehicle to
preserve the status quo.4 But, the idea that the Court has long taken a
colorblind approach to constructing the contours of the First
Amendment—highlighted by its laissez-faire attitude towards certain

* Kiran Sidhu, JD, LLM is an attorney fellow at Bay Area Legal Aid supporting
Project Legal Link. The author thanks Professor Osagie K. Obasogie for cultivating
the space to think critically about Constitutional Law and for encouraging her radical
ideas. She also thanks David G. Carlisle, esq., whose analytical brain and
commitment to advancing racial justice, meant his enthusiasm and accord for the
ideas contained in this piece took form as inspiration to make private thoughts
public. Finally, she thanks the members of this journal for their insightful edits, hard
work, and decision to publish during a political climate where First Amendment
jurisprudence is ripe for renegotiation.
1
See generally Marissa Jackson, Note, Neo-Colonialism, Same Old Racism: A
Critical Analysis of the United States’ Shift Toward Colorblindness as a Tool for the
Protection of the American Colonial Empire and White Supremacy, 11 BERKELEY J.
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 156 (2009) (explaining the shift towards colorblindness in the
American legal and political landscape through a discussion of colonialism).
2
See OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, BLINDED BY SIGHT 115–16 (2014) (explaining that
colorblindness is, inter alia, an “acknowledge[ment] that race is a social construction
without any inherent biological significance. . . . But it uses the constructed nature of
race to conclude that since race has no biological meaning it therefore has no social
meaning and therefore should not be recognized at all. Colorblindness encourages a
disassociation with the social significance of race; it is an affirmative
nonrecognition of how racial meanings, constructed as they may be, still impact
social and legal decision making in a manner that fundamentally shapes everyday
life.”).
3
See id. at 118–19; see also Jackson, supra note 1, at 175.
4
See OBASOGIE, supra note 2, at 145.
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forms of hate speech5—in a manner that likewise preserves White
privilege, is less often acknowledged or discussed.6
For example, many preeminent legal scholars have examined
the deleterious effect that the Court’s non-regulation of hate speech can
have on the psyche of minorities;7 however, it is difficult to find
mainstream liberal scholarship that faults or rebuts the Court’s initial
presumption against content-based discrimination under the First
Amendment.8 Deregulation of speech is viewed as a fundamental civil
liberty in American society, synonymous with “freedom” and

5

See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347–48 (2003) (finding facially
unconstitutional per the First Amendment the provision of Virginia’s cross burning
statute which stated that burning of a cross in public view “shall be prima facie
evidence of an intent to intimidate[.]”); see also R.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 391 (1992) (refusing to uphold the constitutionality of St. Paul ordinance
prohibiting the display of a symbol which “arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender” holding it facially invalid
under the First Amendment).
6
See, e.g., Cedric Merlin Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality: Colorblindness, Frederick
Douglass, and Inverted Critical Race Theory, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 823, 849 (2008)
(“There is a presumption against content-based discrimination under the First
Amendment. Therefore, the content of messages, whether political speech or racist
hate speech, must be ignored to protect the free flowing ideological marketplace.
This fits nicely with the illusion of neutrality—race must be ignored at all costs to
preserve colorblind neutrality.”).
7
See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2332 (1989) [hereinafter, Matsuda, Considering the
Victim’s Story] (“In addition to physical violence, there is the violence of the word.
Racist hate messages, threats, slurs, epithets, and disparagement all hit the gut of
those in the target group.”); see also, MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 7 (1993) [hereinafter, MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND] (“All
of us found ourselves increasingly drawn into writing, speaking, and engaging in
public debate as incidents of assaultive speech increased in recent years . . .
Assaultive speech directly affected our lives and the lives of people from whom we
cared.”).
8
See infra note 10; Cf RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING
WORDS THAT WOUND 204 (2004) (“[A] new form of criticism called First
Amendment legal realism . . . argues that this noble amendment should be subjected
to the same degree of legal skepticism and scrutiny as other legal norms.”); Matsuda,
Considering the Victim’s Story, supra note 7, at 2321 (“In calling for legal sanctions
for racist speech, this Article rejects an absolutist first amendment position. It calls
for movement of the societal response to racist speech from the private to the public
realm.”).
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“democracy.”9 Thus, the Court, through its fashioning of First
Amendment hate speech jurisprudence, and its vehement opposition to
content-based restrictions, has divided scholars into two camps. The
first camp takes the content-neutral, absolutist (read: colorblind)
approach that speech should remain unburdened by regulations that
obstruct the free flow of ideas.10 The second camp, generally comprised
of critical race theorists,11 posits that the Court should institute greater
protection for minorities who are more vulnerable to the effects of hate
speech.12 The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) leads the first
camp in the debate on hate speech,13 and, for progressive legal scholars
who otherwise agree with the ACLU’s position on most topics, it can
be a source of great frustration. It can be especially frustrating for legal
scholars of color who are personally affected by the prevalence of hate

9

See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46
STAN. L. REV. 235, 264 (1994) (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of
Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 884 n.192 (1991)) (“[T]he First Amendment is
special: The First Amendment, more even than other constitutional provisions
conferring fundamental rights, contributes vitally to the preservation of an open,
democratic political regime, at the same time as it secures rights of high importance
to particular individuals.”).
10
See, e.g., Powell, supra note 6, at 849 (“There is a presumption against contentbased discrimination under the First Amendment. Therefore, the content of
messages, whether political speech or racist hate speech, must be ignored to protect
the free flowing ideological marketplace. This fits nicely with the illusion of
neutrality—race must be ignored at all costs to preserve colorblind neutrality.”); see
also Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L REV.
1639, 1654–57 (1993) (characterizing the First Amendment as “about as close to
absolute as the Constitution gets” and—in specifically discussing the cross burning
case, R.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) —noting that reading in the
provisions of the Reconstruction Amendments would be “dangerous business” as
these amendments are “too tenuous” or “too far” from the First Amendment to be
factored into an analysis of R.A.V.).
11
See supra notes 7 and 8.
12
See DELGADO & STEFANIC, supra note 8, at 2 (analyzing the legal and historical
issues that the hate speech debate raises. This includes a strong critique of free
speech absolutists like the ACLU on the basis that such a position is inherently postracial because it presupposes a world without racial stratification).
13
See Speech on Campus, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/other/speech-campus (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) (explaining
why the ACLU defends “unpopular” or “offensive” ideas including hate speech on
campus that people find bigoted).
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speech.14 Or worse, scholars of color like myself, who are negatively
affected by hate speech, can be made to feel feeble-minded for taking
offense to such speech. This subdual15 is, arguably, a direct result of the
Court’s colorblind construction of the First Amendment.
This article critiques the ACLU and the Court’s content-neutral
position by refusing to choose sides in a debate that is doomed from the
start.16 Of course, any argument that leads with the proposition that
there is a First Amendment right not to have one’s feelings hurt, and
then follows with the assertion that the Court should act to suppress
speech anytime a minority is offended, will be greeted with great
skepticism.17 Rather, this article will illustrate how the ACLU’s support
of the Court’s colorblind approach to analyzing hate speech—and
specifically, cross burning under the First Amendment—is frustrating
precisely because it serves as yet another example of the reification of
White supremacy within constitutional law.
Using First Amendment cross burning cases as a vehicle, this
article seeks to expose the Court’s commitment to preserving the status
quo with respect to racial hierarchy. Part I of this article provides a brief
primer on First Amendment jurisprudence and how the Court has
crafted its colorblind, content-neutral contours.18 Parts II and III discuss
the ways in which the Court and the ACLU maintain White privilege
when they examine both “fighting words” and “true threats” by looking
chiefly at what the speaker intends by the speech, and not what a
See MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 7, at 1 (“This [hate
speech] debate has deeply divided the liberal civil rights/civil liberties community
and produced strained relationships within the membership of organizations like the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).”); see also DELGADO & STEFANIC, supra
note 8, at 32–33.
15
See, e.g., DELGADO & STEFANIC, supra note 8, at 208–09 (discussing arguments
that emphasize “a certain let-it-roll-off-your-back toughness” with respect to
regulating hate speech).
16
See infra Parts II, III, and IV.
17
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (“[S]peech cannot be
restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt. If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”) (citation omitted); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
414 (1992) (White, J., concurring) (“Although the ordinance reaches conduct that is
unprotected, it also makes criminal expressive conduct that causes only hurt feelings,
offense, or resentment, [which] is protected by the First Amendment.”).
18
See infra Part I.
14
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reasonable marginalized listener receiving that speech would consider
to be fight-inducing, or threatening, respectively.19 Part III additionally
offers Dr. Chris Demaske’s alternate framework for analyzing hate
speech that considers the power dynamics at play in First Amendment
jurisprudence and provides a means of operationalizing the critique
herein that current First Amendment tests lack an historical lens.20 In
Part IV, this article addresses how the Court and the ACLU reify White
supremacy by characterizing hate speech as a form of valuable political
debate.21 In other words, Part IV examines how the Court’s
unwillingness to uphold content-based restrictions on conduct like cross
burning illustrates its belief that cross burnings’ expressive content is
not worthless or of de minimis value to society, and that it belongs
within the marketplace of ideas, which is troubling, to say the least.22
I.

THE COLORBLIND CONTOURS
PRIVILEGE WHITENESS.

OF THE

FIRST AMENDMENT

Generally speaking, the First Amendment prevents the
government from regulating speech23 or expressive conduct24 as a
response to societal disapproval of the ideas expressed. The Court has
repeatedly held that where the government seeks to restrict speech or
conduct based on its content, such content-based regulations25 are

19

See infra Parts II, III.
See infra notes 149–59 and accompanying text.
21
See infra Part IV.
22
See infra Part IV.
23
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–11 (1940).
24
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
25
See Amanda J. Congdon, Comment, Burned Out: The Supreme Court Strikes
Down Virginia’s Cross Burning Statute in Virginia v. Black, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
1049, 1060 (2004) (“A law that restricts speech is content-based if the government
bases its regulation on the subject matter or viewpoint of the expression. In contrast,
a law is content-neutral if the government’s justification for the law does not relate
to the content of the speech.”); see also Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the
Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34
MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 622 (2003) (allocating some of the confusion in First
Amendment jurisprudence to the definition of “content” and arguing that “the proper
meaning of ‘content’ is the communicative impact. The appropriate question is . . .
whether its application depends upon the communicative impact of the speech
affected. If so, then the action is content-based.”).
20

Sidhu

342

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 17:2

presumptively invalid.26 The Court, however, has reasoned that our
American society, “like other free, but civilized societies,” has carved
out certain narrow restrictions on the content of speech in certain
proscribed areas.27 These limited “proscribable”28 categories of contentbased restrictions include speech that is obscene,29 or defamatory.30 The
Court also permits States to ban a “true threat” without running afoul of
the First Amendment.31 Perhaps most famously, the Court held in
Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, that States may also restrict
speech that constitutes “fighting words,” or “those [words] which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace[,]”32 or “those personally abusive epithets which, when
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common
knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.”33
While the Court has acknowledged that the regulation of all of
these excepted categories is content-based, the Court has held that the
First Amendment is inapplicable “because [the categories’] expressive
content is worthless or of de minimis value to society.”34 Recently, the
Court further unpacked its rationale behind the regulation of these
categories under the First Amendment, and limited the government’s
26

For examples of cases where the court determined that content-based regulations
are presumptively invalid, see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
27
Id.
28
See id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court [in R.A.V.] revises this
categorical approach. It is not, the Court rules, that certain ‘categories’ of expression
are ‘unprotected,’ but rather that certain ‘elements’ of expression are wholly
‘proscribable.’ To the Court, an expressive act, like a chemical compound, consists
of more than one element. Although the act may be regulated because it contains a
proscribable element, it may not be regulated on the basis of another
(nonproscribable) element it also contains.”).
29
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (“We hold that obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”).
30
See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256 (1952) (holding racist speech
that amounts to libel was beyond constitutional protection); see also Roth, 354 U.S
at 483 (“[L]ibelous utterances are not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech.”).
31
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (per curiam) (citing Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord,
R.A.V, 505 U.S at 388 (“[T]hreats of violence are outside the First Amendment.”).
32
Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (citation omitted).
33
Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)).
34
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 400 (White, J., concurring) (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
571–72).
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power to legislate therein.35 The Court reasoned that the government
should be permitted to control their proscribable content insofar as such
categories act as vehicles for content discrimination, but, the
government cannot extend the regulation of the category further so that
“nonproscribable” content is regulated.36 For example, the government
may pass a law making it illegal to publish libelous content, but cannot
legislate specifically against libel critical of racial minorities,37 because
that would indicate the government’s hostility or favoritism towards the
underlying content of the libel.38
In other words, First Amendment regulations should be
“content-neutral,”39 or colorblind, to borrow phrasing from scholars and
justices describing the Court’s late 20th century approach to the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.40 As
one legal scholar avers, “the content of messages, whether political
speech or racist hate speech, must be ignored to protect the free flowing
ideological marketplace.”41 Therefore, this colorblind First Amendment
framework requires those wishing to proscribe racist speech to show
that the content may be regulated as part of one of the excepted, contentbased categories, such as fighting words.

35

See id. at 383–84 (Scalia, J., majority).
See id.
37
See id. at 384. But cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 284 (1952) (Douglass,
J., dissenting) (“Hitler and his Nazis showed how evil a conspiracy could be which
was aimed at destroying a race by exposing it to contempt, derision, and obloquy. I
would be willing to concede that [libelous] conduct directed at a race or group in this
country could be made an indictable offense. For such a project would be more than
the exercise of free speech. Like picketing, it would be free speech plus.”).
38
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386 (“The government may not regulate use based on
hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.”).
39
See Congdon, supra note 25, at 1060 (“A law that restricts speech is content-based
if the government bases its regulation on the subject matter or viewpoint of the
expression. In contrast, a law is content-neutral if the government's justification for
the law does not relate to the content of the speech.”); see also Gielow Jacobs, supra
note 25, at 622 (allocating some of the confusion in First Amendment jurisprudence
to the definition of “content” and arguing that “the proper meaning of ‘content’ is the
communicative impact. The appropriate question is . . . whether its application
depends upon the communicative impact of the speech affected. If so, then the action
is content-based.”).
40
See OBASOGIE, supra note 2, at 118–29.
41
Powell, supra note 6, at 849.
36
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WHITE SUPREMACY AFFIRMED: THE COURT RULES RACIST
SPEECH IS NOT A FORM OF FIGHTING WORDS.

In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court defined fighting
words as “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.”42 In addition, for plaintiffs
arguing that racist hate speech constitutes proscribable fighting words,
they must show that the speech to be regulated “[is] of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” 43 In
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court explained why burning crosses
privately or publicly cannot be considered fighting words.44 In this case,
a White individual, known in court documents as R.A.V., burned a cross
inside the fenced yard of a Black family that lived across the street from
the house where R.A.V. was staying.45 R.A.V. was prosecuted under the
St. Paul Bias–Motivated Crime Ordinance,46 which made it a
misdemeanor to place on public or private property certain symbols or
objects, including burning crosses, when done with the knowledge that
such conduct would “arouse anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”47 The Petitioner began
his oral argument by asking the Court, “[t]o what degree does
abhorrence of cross burning justify banning it [under the Ordinance]?”48
The R.A.V. Court, led by Justice Scalia, answered abhorrence alone is
not sufficient, reasoning, “[a]lthough the [O]rdinance reaches conduct
that is unprotected, it also makes criminal expressive conduct that
causes only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment, [which] is protected

42

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
Id.
44
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
45
Id. at 379.
46
ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
47
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 (citing ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
48
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
(1992) (No. 90-7675), 1991 WL 636263, at *3. Petitioner’s oral argument to the
Court in the R.A.V. case began with the observation that “[e]ach generation must
reaffirm the guarantee of the First Amendment with the hard cases. The framers
understood the dangers of orthodoxy and standardized thought and chose liberty. We
are once again faced with a case that will demonstrate whether or not there is room
for the freedom for the thought that we hate, whether there is room for the eternal
vigilance necessary for the opinions that we loathe.” Id.
43

Sidhu

2018]

COLORBLIND PROTECTION OF CROSS BURNING

345

by the First Amendment.”49 Therefore, the Court held, the Ordinance
was “fatally overbroad and invalid on its face”50 under the First
Amendment. Scalia’s remarks are consistent with past constitutional
decisions declaring that Americans cannot invoke the First Amendment
whenever they are hurt or offended by particular speech or expressive
conduct.51
In R.A.V., however, the Minnesota court below determined that
the Ordinance was not overbroad because it reached only those
expressions that constitute fighting words within the meaning of
Chaplinksy.52 Justice Scalia thought differently, stating:
Although the phrase in the [O]rdinance, ‘arouses anger, alarm
or resentment in others,’ has been limited by the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s construction to reach only those symbols or
displays that amount to ‘fighting words,’ the remaining,
unmodified terms make clear that the [O]rdinance applies only
to ‘fighting words’ that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’ Displays containing
abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are
permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified
disfavored topics. Those who wish to use fighting words in
connection with other ideas—to express hostility, for example,
on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or
homosexuality—are not covered. The First Amendment does
not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.53

49

R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added).
Id.
51
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (“[S]peech cannot be
restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt. If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”) (citations omitted); see also, STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1084 (7th ed. 2013) (“[T]erminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)] stands for the
proposition that speech may not be restricted because the ideas expressed offend the
audience.”).
52
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381.
53
Id. at 391 (citations omitted).
50
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St. Paul additionally argued that the Ordinance fell within
another specific exception that allowed content discrimination, that is,
when it is aimed at the “secondary effects”54 of speech.55 St. Paul
averred that the Ordinance was intended not to protect the speaker’s
right to free expression, but instead to protect against the victimization
of people who have been a part of historically discriminated groups.56
The Court disposed of this argument by pointing out that two years after
that “secondary effects” case was decided, the Court clarified in a
subsequent case that, when considering content-based restriction,
“secondary effects” cannot include listeners’ reactions or emotive
impact to speech, because this analysis would cause “damage to free
and equal debate[.]”57 Moreover, such an addition “could set the Court
on a road that will lead to the evisceration of First Amendment
freedoms[,]”58 an argument with which the ACLU concurs. The ACLU,
joined by other groups in amici for R.A.V., contend that they “do not
suggest that the reasonable apprehension of fear alone is a sufficient
predicate for criminal prosecution.”59 As the case deals with
suppressing speech, the ACLU, et al., “believe that the state must carry
the additional burden of proving that the speaker intended his statement
to be taken as a threat, even if he had no intention of actually carrying
[the threat] out.”60
The petitioner cross burner in this case, joined by the ACLU,61
asked the Court to modify the fighting words doctrine to narrow its
54

See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47, 54 (1986) (holding
that where a city passed an ordinance regulating the time, place, and manner of adult
movie theatres—finding that its “predominate concerns” were with the “secondary
effects” of adult theaters on the surrounding community, and not with the content of
adult films themselves—this finding was more than adequate to establish that the
city’s zoning interests content-neutral, and unrelated to the suppression of free
expression).
55
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 394.
56
Id.
57
Id. (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 321 (1988)).
58
Id. at 338 (Brennan, J., concurring).
59
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 21, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (No. 90-7675), 1991 WL
11003956 at * 21 (citing Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 48 (1975) (Marshall,
J., concurring)).
60
Id. (emphasis added).
61
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 10–11, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (No. 90-7675),
1991 WL 11003956 at *10–11 (“[A]mici do not believe that this limiting
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scope, and thereby invalidate the Ordinance as overbroad pursuant to
this suggested narrower construction.62 However, he argued that even a
narrower doctrine would be “ineffective because . . . denominating
particular expression a ‘fighting word’ because of the impact of its
ideological content upon the audience is inconsistent with the First
Amendment.”63 In fact, even in Chaplinksy, the original fighting words
case, the state court below declared that in interpreting the fighting
words statute,64 “[t]he word ‘offensive’ is not to be defined in terms of
what a particular addressee thinks. The test is what men of common
intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an
average addressee to fight.”65
St. Paul’s argument regarding the effect on the minority listener
of hate speech, and the Court’s disposal of it, is especially interesting.
The Court not only discards the argument using First Amendment
precedent, which holds that considering how listeners might feel would
destroy freedom of speech as we know it, but the Court also seems to
reject the argument on the basis that cross burning does not actually
construction is sufficient to rescue the ordinance from invalidity. . . . Whatever else
one might say about the Chaplinsky and Brandenburg standards, they have rarely
been met in the reported cases. By contrast, one need only open the daily paper to
see how much protected speech has the potential to arouse ‘anger, alarm or
resentment’ on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.”).
62
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381.
63
Id. at 381 n.3 (“An important component of petitioner’s argument is…that
narrowly construing the ordinance to cover only ‘fighting words’ cannot cure this
fundamental defect. In his briefs in this Court, petitioner argued that a narrowing
construction was ineffective because (1) its boundaries were vague, and because (2)
denominating particular expression a ‘fighting word’ because of the impact of its
ideological content upon the audience is inconsistent with the First Amendment . . .
At oral argument, counsel for petitioner reiterated this second point: ‘It is…one of
my positions, that in [punishing only some fighting words and not others], even
though it is a subcategory, technically, of unprotected conduct, [the ordinance] still is
picking out an opinion, a disfavored message, and making that clear through the
State.’”) (internal citations omitted).
64
The Appellant in Chaplinksy was convicted of violating Chapter 378, Section 2 of
the Public Laws of New Hampshire. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
569 (1942). As cited in Chaplinksy, this law dictates that “[n]o person shall address
any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any
street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make
any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or
annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation.” Id.
65
Id. at 573.
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have the effect that the listener claims to experience.66 Justice Scalia
explains that the reason fighting words are categorically excluded from
First Amendment protection is because the mode of expressing an idea,
not the idea itself, whatever it might be, is “particularly intolerable (and
socially unnecessary).”67 But, Scalia writes that St. Paul “has not
singled out an especially offensive mode of expression—it has not, for
example, selected for prohibition only those fighting words that
communicate ideas in a threatening (as opposed to a merely obnoxious)
manner.”68 This suggests that, to Scalia, cross burning is simply
“obnoxious,” as opposed to actually threatening, to which countless
legal scholars, and even Supreme Court Justices—including Clarence
Thomas—would likely retort, how else should cross burning be
perceived but threatening?69 Even if the Court refuses to legitimize the
particular addressee’s level of offense to a burning cross, the likelihood
that “men of common intelligence”70 would understand that a burning
cross would not “cause an average addressee to fight”71 is low, given
that “[t]he world’s oldest, most persistent terrorist organization is . . .
the Ku Klux Klan [KKK][,]” which often utilizes cross burning as its
chief instrument of inflicting terror.72
Therefore, considering the effect of particular hate speech on the
listener, as opposed to what the speaker intends by the hate speech, is
absolutely necessary in situations where the Court’s own subjective,
White-centric, and colorblind notions of what is, and is not threatening
cloud its judgement with regard to what speech should be afforded First
Amendment protection. By taking a content-neutral approach that

66

See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393; supra notes 52–58 and accompanying text.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393.
68
Id.
69
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 391 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In our
culture, cross burning has almost invariably meant lawlessness and understandably
instills in its victims well-grounded fear of physical violence.”).
70
Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 573.
71
Id.
72
See Black, 538 U.S. at 388–89 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing M. NEWTON & J.
NEWTON, THE KU KLUX KLAN: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA VII (1991)) (“For those not easily
frightened, cross burning has been followed by more extreme measures, such as
beatings and murder.”) (citations omitted). Id. at 343–44 (majority opinion) (“The
Klan has often used cross burnings as a tool of intimidation and a threat of
impending violence[.]”) (citations omitted).
67
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disregards the listener’s more-than-valid emotive response,73 the Court
contours the First Amendment in a manner that perpetuates White
supremacy.
III.

FOR TRUE THREATS, THE COURT HOLDS A CROSS BURNER’S
INTENT IS WORTH MORE THAN THE EFFECT OF
CROSSBURNING ON MINORITY LISTENERS, THUS UPHOLDING
WHITE SUPREMACY

The type of intent an individual needs to communicate a “true
threat” under the First Amendment, i.e., whether the Court should
consider just the speaker’s intent (subjective approach)74 or
alternatively, both the effect on the listener of hate speech and the
speaker’s intent (objective approach)75 is currently the subject of a

73

See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 321, 337 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (concluding
that the content-based nature of a constraint on speech cannot depend on whether the
restriction is intended to address secondary effects).
74
Some courts reason that the “clear import” of Black “is that only intentional
threats are criminally punishable consistently with the First Amendment.” United
States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2005); See, e.g. United States v.
Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because the true threat
requirement is imposed by the Constitution, the subjective test set forth in Black
must be read into all threat statutes that criminalize pure speech.”); United States v.
Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 500 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that “an entirely objective
definition” of true threats may “no longer [be] tenable” after Black); United States v.
Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 360)
(stating that a constitutionally proscribed true threat “must be made ‘with the intent
of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.’”); White, 670 F.3d at 520
(Floyd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Black…makes purely
objective approach to ascertain true threat no longer tenable.”).
75
Other circuits to consider the issue have concluded that “Black did not work a ‘sea
change,’ tacitly overruling decades of [circuit] case law by importing a requirement
of subjective intent into all threat-prohibiting statutes.” United States v. Martinez,
736 F.3d 981, 987–88 (11th Cir. 2013); accord United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d
473, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 59 (2013) (“Black does not
work the sea change that Jeffries proposes.”); United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498,
508 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We are not convinced that Black effected the change that
White claims.”). See also United States v. Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2013)
(holding, on plain error review, that “this court has applied an objective defendant
vantage point standard post-Black[,]” and “[a]bsent further clarification from the
Supreme Court, [they] see no basis to venture further and no basis to depart from
[their] circuit law.”).
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circuit split.76 This split follows the Court’s decision in the most recent
cross burning case, Virginia v. Black.77 In Black, the Court considered
whether a Virginia statute, which made it a felony to burn a cross on
private or public property with “the intent of intimidating any person or
group of persons,”78 violated the First Amendment.79 Of utmost
importance to the Court,80 the statute also stated, “[a]ny such burning of
a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person
or group of persons.”81 Three Virginia residents in this case were
convicted separately under the statute.82 One White man, ironically
named Black, led a KKK rally in 1998, in which he burned a cross in an
open field where other KKK members gathered;83 the other two White
men drove a truck onto a Black victim’s private property, planted a cross
on his lawn, and set it on fire.84 The Black individual stated that he was
“very nervous,” because he “didn't know what would be the next
phase,” and because “a cross burned in your yard . . . tells you that it’s
just the first round.”85 The Court itself admitted that “cross burning is
often intimidating, intended to create a pervasive fear in victims that
they are a target of violence,”86 and held that Virginia could institute a
general ban on cross burning with an intent to intimidate given cross
burnings’ “long and pernicious history as a signal of impending
violence” in America.87
Despite the Court’s five-page analysis88 on why cross burning
in the U.S. is a “symbol of hate,”89 and how it is inextricably linked to
United States v. Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2013) (“We are invited in this
case to change our circuit law on the type of intent needed by a defendant to
communicate “true threats[.]” We note there is a circuit split on the question of intent
in the aftermath of Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).”).
77
538 U.S. 343 (2003).
78
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996).
79
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
80
Id. at 364 (“The prima facie evidence provision, as interpreted by the jury
instruction, renders the statute unconstitutional.”).
81
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996).
82
Black, 538 U.S. at 348.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 350.
85
Id. (citations omitted).
86
Id. at 360.
87
Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
88
Id. at 352–57.
89
Id. at 357 (citation omitted).
76
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the KKK,90 White supremacy, and violence in this nation,91 it
nonetheless held that the Virginia statute—as written—was
unconstitutional,92 thereby overturning Black’s conviction,93 and
vacating the judgment as to the two other cross burners.94 Justice
O’Connor, writing for the plurality, reasoned that while the First
Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw content-neutral cross burning
done with the intent to intimidate (recognizing that such conduct is a
“particularly virulent form of intimidation”),95 the prima facie provision
violated the First Amendment because it served as a “shortcut” to
determining all of the “contextual factors that are necessary to decide
whether a particular cross burning is intended to intimidate.”96 Citing
to its own five-page construction of the history of cross burning,97 the
Court reasoned that a cross burning is not always intended to intimidate,
“[r]ather, sometimes the cross burning is a statement of ideology, a
symbol of group solidarity. It is a ritual used at Klan gatherings, and it
is used to represent the Klan itself. Thus, it held, burning a cross at a
political rally would almost certainly be protected expression.”98
The Supreme Court of Virginia, and the Virginia legislature by
virtue of writing the prima facie intent clause into the statute, had
decided that the act of cross burning alone, with no evidence of intent
to intimidate, would “suffice for arrest and prosecution.”99 But the Court
felt otherwise, deciding unilaterally that burning a cross could
symbolize political affiliation,100 comprise part of their ceremonial
rituals101, and represent general Klan group identity102, the way that hair
gel unites the cast of Mad Men. This is White supremacy at its finest, in
that the Court elevates cross burning’s alleged expressive content and

90

Id. at 352.
Id. at 354.
92
Black, 538 U.S. at 348.
93
Id. at 367.
94
Id. at 367–68.
95
Id. at 363.
96
Id. at 367.
97
Black, 538 U.S. at 365.
98
Id. 365–66 (citations omitted).
99
Id. at 364.
100
Id. at 357.
101
Id. At 356-57.
102
Id.
91
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reveals its own disregard for the feelings of those experiencing
threatening hate speech.103
The true threat definition is undoubtedly murky. The Court
defines “true threats” as those in which the “speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”104
It went on to say that, “[t]he speaker need not actually intend to carry
out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats “protect[s]
individuals from the fear of violence,”105 and “from the disruption that
fear engenders,”106 in addition to protecting people “from the possibility
that the threatened violence will occur.”107 Thus, from the Court’s stated
analysis of the true threat exemption from First Amendment protection,
it is unclear whether true threats must be analyzed from the perspective
of the speaker, or from the perspective of the person to whom the speech
is directed.108 It is also unclear whether the speaker must intend simply

103

See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (“political hyperbole” [sic]
is not a true threat); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388).
105
Black, 538 U.S. at 360.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
See Paul T. Crane, True Threats and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225,
1226 (2006) (explaining that “in providing a definition, the Court created more
confusion than elucidation” and “spawned as many questions as answers.”); see also
Steven Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation and Free Speech,
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1288 (2005) (“Justice O’Connor’s opinion in the
cross burning case borders on the incoherent.”).
104
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to communicate, or to subjectively intend to communicate and
threaten,109 hence the circuit split.110
What seems clear, however, is that by ruling that a cross burning
by itself, cannot be understood as a prima facie intent to intimidate, the
Court has taken an unstated position. That is, the Court endorses the
view that the speaker’s intent matters more than a reasonable listener,
or the minority individual’s emotive response, of being “very nervous”
when seeing a cross burning on his lawn.111 According to this terrorized
individual’s “common intelligence” to use language from the Court’s
fighting words doctrine,112 cross burning was just round one of other

109

See United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 636–37 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining
that “while the jury instruction correctly stated that ‘intimidation’ involves ‘words
and conduct that would put an ordinary, reasonable person in fear or apprehension,’
it failed to specify that the statute requires ‘fear or apprehension’ of injury inflicted
by the defendant. Whether the threat is of injury to person or property, there is no
doubt that it must be a threat of injury brought about—rather than merely
predicted—by the defendant.”); accord United States v. Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136,
1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that a constitutionally proscribed true threat “must be
made ‘with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.’”
(quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003))). Cf. United States v.
Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding, on plain error review, that “this
court has applied an objective defendant vantage point standard post-Black[,]” and
“[a]bsent further clarification from the Supreme Court, [they] see no basis to venture
further and no basis to depart from [their] circuit law.”).
110
Compare United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) and rev’d and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (citing
Black, 538 U.S. at 359) (“[W]e read ‘statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence’ to mean that the speaker must intend to make the communication. It would
require adding language the Court did not write to read the passage as ‘statements
where the speaker means to communicate [and intends the statement to be
understood as] a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence.’ This is not what the Court wrote, and it is inconsistent with the logic
animating the true threats exception.”) (internal citation omitted) with Cassel, 408
F.3d at 631 (“The clear import of [the ‘true threats’ definition in Virginia v. Black] is
that only intentional threats are criminally punishable consistently with the First
Amendment. First, the definition requires that ‘the speaker means to
communicate…an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence.’ A natural reading
of this language embraces not only the requirement that the communication itself be
intentional, but also the requirement that the speaker intend for his language to
threaten the victim.”).
111
Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
112
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
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progressively worse phases of threats and violence.113 The Court’s
minimization of the threatening effect of cross burning on minority
individuals in this nation, as seen in Black, is nevertheless consistent
with the aforementioned discussion of Justice Scalia’s analysis in
R.A.V., that cross burning is more “obnoxious” than actually threatening
fighting words.114 These two cross burning cases demonstrate that the
Court’s First Amendment analysis will disregard history and context
and adopt a White-centric framework through which to evaluate threat
levels. And that White individuals’ right to express themselves through
a discriminatory act foretelling racial violence is valued equally if not
greater than the Black person’s reactive fear of that impending
violence.115 Herein lies the reification of White supremacy through the
Court’s construction of First Amendment law.
The ACLU certainly takes the position that Black compels the
consideration of the speaker’s “subjective intent to threaten”116 in any
true threat analysis.117 According to the ACLU, “one person’s
opprobrium may be another’s threat,” therefore, “[a] statute that
proscribes speech without regard to the speaker’s intended meaning
113

Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992) (“[I]t has not, for
example, selected for prohibition only those fighting words that communicate ideas
in a threatening (as opposed to merely obnoxious) manner. Rather, it has proscribed
fighting words of whatever manner that communicate messages of racial, gender, or
religious intolerance.”).
115
See Black, 538 U.S. at 400 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“That cross burning subjects
its targets, and, sometimes, an unintended audience, to extreme emotional distress,
and is virtually never viewed merely as ‘unwanted communication,’ but rather, as a
physical threat, is of no concern to the plurality. Henceforth, under the plurality’s
view, physical safety will be valued less than the right to be free from unwanted
communications.”) (internal citations omitted).
116
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 6, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (No. 90-7675), 1991 WL
11003956 at *6 (“Establishing subjective intent to threaten as a constitutional mens
rea requirement for true threats would not require any deviation from this Court’s
precedents.”); see also Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015)
(No. 13-983), 2014 WL 4215752 at *6 (“Although lower courts have divided over
how to interpret Black, this Court’s plain language and reasoning strongly support
the conclusion that Black defined true threats to include only those statements made
with the intent to threaten.”).
117
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, Elonis, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13983).
114
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runs the risk of punishing protected First Amendment expression simply
because it is crudely or zealously expressed.”118 As a result, the ACLU
argues that the Court’s plain language and reasoning in Black supports
the view that true threats should include only those statements made
with the intent to threaten,119 in order to “ensure adequate breathing
room for such [core political, artistic, and ideological speech.]”120
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, mandates an “objective
test,” which considers whether the speaker knowingly intended to
communicate, and whether an objective or reasonable person would
regard it as a serious expression of harm, thereby rendering irrelevant
the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten.121 Likewise, the Third Circuit
has determined that reading the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten
into Black contravenes the logic undergirding the true threats exception,
as it “would fail to protect individuals from ‘the fear of violence’ and
the ‘disruption that fear engenders,’ because it would protect speech that
a reasonable speaker would understand to be threatening.”122
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit has explicitly maintained that its
objective test in determining whether a statement constitutes a true
threat is if “an ordinary reasonable recipient who is familiar with the
context . . . would interpret [the statement] as a threat of injury.”123
118

Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 6, Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983), 2014
WL 4215752 at *5.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616–17 (5th Cir. 2004)
(“However, the government can proscribe a true threat of violence without offending
the First Amendment. Speech is a ‘true threat’ and therefore unprotected if an
objectively reasonable person would interpret the speech as a ‘serious expression of
an intent to cause a present or future harm.’ The protected status of the threatening
speech is not determined by whether the speaker had the subjective intent to carry
out the threat; rather, to lose the protection of the First Amendment and be lawfully
punished, the threat must be intentionally or knowingly communicated to either the
object of the threat or a third person. Importantly, whether a speaker intended to
communicate a potential threat is a threshold issue, and a finding of no intent to
communicate obviates the need to assess whether the speech constitutes a ‘true
threat.’”).
122
United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 329–30 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
123
United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 507 (4th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). See
also Crane, supra note 108, at 1246 (citing United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d
1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973)) (“The reasonable listener test, the second version of the
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Some courts have called the “reasonable listener standard” a strict
liability standard, that allows a jury to convict speakers for making
ambiguous statements that the listener might find threatening,
regardless of whether the speaker knew the listener would find it
threatening.124 But, the Fourth Circuit, in adopting a standard that takes
into account what the reasonable listener perceives, knowing the context
of the speaker’s threats—as opposed to what the reasonable cross burner
intends—removes the element of White privilege that is inherent in the
Court and the ACLU’s reliance on the speaker’s intent in cross
burning.125 Undoubtedly, with regard to cross burning, “I’m sorry you
feel that way” is hardly an appropriate or logical response by the
speaker, given the history of racism and terror associated with such
conduct; only the Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits’ articulation of the
true threat test, which take listener’s experiences into account, can
provide adequate protection for minority groups victimized by hate
speech and the hate crimes which oftentimes follow.126
Moreover, focusing on what the speaker intends by the speech
versus what the reasonable listener perceives, maintains White
supremacy in First Amendment jurisprudence, because it ignores the
reality that an act of terrorism against minorities in America does not
need to be blatantly hateful for it to be understood as a true threat, or a
fighting word.127 The speaker’s intent does not need to be made crystal
clear by the speaker, because White supremacist groups leverage
hundreds of years’ worth of history and state-sanctioned racism when
objective test, takes a different perspective: a communication is a true threat if ‘an
ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the [statement]
would interpret it as a threat of injury.’”).
124
See United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Where a
statement may be ambiguous, the entire context, including the tone used, may assist
the jury in determining whether that ambiguous statement was a threat.”); see also
Crane, supra note 108, at 1246 (“In reasonable listener jurisdictions, the only intent
element is that the statement was knowingly made.”).
125
See Crane, supra note 108, at 1246 (“The reasonable listener test, the second
version of the objective test, takes a different perspective: a communication is a true
threat if ‘an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the
[statement].’”).
126
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 343–44 (2003) (explaining that “The Klan
has often used cross burnings as a tool of intimidation and a threat of impending
violence[.] . . . For those not easily frightened, cross burning has been followed by
more extreme measures, such as beatings and murder.”) (citations omitted).
127
See supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text.
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they threaten racial minorities.128 In Black, Justice Thomas forcefully
begins his dissent by asserting, “[i]n every culture, certain things
acquire meaning well beyond what outsiders can comprehend. That
goes for both the sacred…and the profane. I believe that cross burning
is the paradigmatic example of the latter.”129 Alexander Tsesis, who has
written extensively on how hate speech can catalyze crimes against
humanity130 maintains, “[s]tatements against out-groups can reflect the
speakers’ willingness to act in accordance to prejudice, [clear examples
including] the connection between historical symbols like burning
crosses and swastikas with menacing behavior.”131 Yet, in an
Establishment Clause case, Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, the Court ruled that the KKK cross was simply a religious
symbol, thereby overturning the lower court’s decision to deny the
KKK its permit to place a cross in the state-house plaza (a public forum)
during the Christmas season.132 Justice Scalia writing for the majority,
therefore, ruled in favor of the KKK’s right to erect a cross, holding that
the KKK’s cross was private religious Christian speech, which is as
fully protected under the free speech clause of the First Amendment as
secular private expression.133 Though Justice Thomas concurred with
the result, he wrote separately to vehemently oppose the Court’s initial
presumption that the KKK’s cross is a symbol of Christianity.134 He
See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 388–89 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In holding [the ban
on cross burning with intent to intimidate] unconstitutional, the Court ignores Justice
Holmes’ familiar aphorism that ‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic.’ The
world’s oldest, most persistent terrorist organization is not European or even Middle
Eastern in origin. Fifty years before the Irish Republican Army was organized, a
century before Al Fatah declared its holy war on Israel, the Ku Klux Klan was
actively harassing, torturing, and murdering in the United States. Today its members
remain fanatically committed to a course of violent opposition to social progress and
racial equality in the United States.”) (internal punctuation and citations omitted).
129
Black, 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
130
ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES THE
WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS chs. 2–4 (2002); Alexander
Tsesis, The Empirical Shortcomings of First Amendment Jurisprudence: An
Historical Perspective on the Power of Hate Speech, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 729,
740–55 (2000); Alexander Tsesis, The Boundaries of Free Speech, 8 HARV. LATINO
L. REV. 141, 142 (2005).
131
Alexander Tsesis, The Boundaries of Free Speech, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 141,
143 (2005).
132
Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760–61 (1995).
133
Id. at 760–61.
134
Id. at 770–72.
128
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argues that the KKK’s cross is a “symbol of hate,” and “a symbol of
[W]hite supremacy” as opposed to a symbol of religious worship.135 As
Thomas avers in Black, “the connection between cross burning and
violence is well ingrained[.]”136 In fact, he refers to “violent and
terroristic conduct” as “the Siamese twin of cross burning[.]”137 Thomas
goes on to cite lower court opinions wherein courts recognize that, for
minority individuals, fearing for their own lives and the lives of their
loved ones is a reasonable reaction to seeing a burning cross based on
historical events.138 For example, in one cited case, a woman testified
that as a Black American specifically, the burning cross symbolized
“[n]othing good. Murder, hanging, rape, lynching. Just anything bad
that you can name.”139
Moreover, implicit acts of racism deserve attention even if legal
institutions are unwilling to recognize them as such. One of the
resounding critiques of the seminal Equal Protection Clause case,
Washington v. Davis, wherein the Supreme Court held that a facially
neutral law with even a profound racially discriminatory impact was not
a per se violation of the Equal Protection clause without proof of
discriminatory intent, is that it requires minority plaintiffs to produce a
“smoking gun” to prove claims of racism.140 Indeed, much of implicit
bias discourse and movement-building is focused on pushing the law to
recognize implicit bias and implicit racism, precisely because of the
standard set in Washington v. Davis and its progeny.141 But, as scholars
135

Id.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 390 (2003) (emphasis added).
137
Id. at 394.
138
Id. at 390–91.
139
Id. at 390–93.
140
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245–48 (1976); See also Jonathan Feingold
& Kren Lorang, Defusing Implicit Bias, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 210.221
(citing to Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) to introduce current disparate
treatment theory, then noting that current efforts by plaintiffs trying to make a
credible racism allegation requires that they find evidence of the defendant’s
conscious intent to discriminate. “[T]hose alleging racism…search for the smokinggun quote or document that will reveal racist intent.”).
141
See, e.g., Intent Standard, Equal Justice Society,
https://equaljusticesociety.org/law/intentdoctrine/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2017)
(“Existing equal protection law fails to incorporate many modern-day manifestations
of discrimination and therefore deprives potential plaintiffs of access to our courts
and redress for discrimination. Moreover, conservatives have worked to entrench the
“intent” approach and push us down a path towards colorblind Constitutionalism.
136
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maintain, “[a] ‘smoking gun’ is rarely found because naked prejudice is
kept safely hidden.”142 Instead, most racism “often reflect[s] our
familiarity with explicit biases,” and only hints at race. 143 However,
racial animus is not a thing of the past, simply because racial epithets
have become more nuanced and less overt. Instead, we must use
historically-based context clues to gap-fill: the KKK no longer needs to
accompany its crosses with placards espousing racist vitriol, the cross
speaks for itself and relies on our familiarity with history and on explicit
biases to make its point. But, the Court—in a display of severe historical
amnesia—instead holds that the KKK’s cross is a symbol of its
celebration of Christianity.144 An analogously unsound ruling would be
if the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Germany’s highest court)
were to adjudicate an issue today involving a neo-Nazi group’s right to
erect a swastika, by premising a favorable opinion to the neo-Nazi group
on the basis that the swastika represents to that group an ancient
religious icon used in the Indian subcontinent. Such a statement is
illogical precisely because it ignores any and all historical context.
The emotive response of fear instilled in individual minorities
who are victimized by White supremacist rhetoric, and their “common
intelligence” about what a burning cross signifies, is informed not just
by any individualized instance of terror, but rather, by the codification
of pages of history that makes up America’s past of slavery, racial
segregation and state-sanctioned discrimination.145 The Court, in
allowing such conduct to receive First Amendment protection,
contributes to a re-writing of history so as to ignore the real experiences
of terror experienced by minorities. Thus, for the Court to adequately
protect minorities, it is crucial that First Amendment jurisprudence
To address this problem, [Equal Justice Society] has successfully facilitated the
incorporation of the cognitive science theory of ‘implicit bias’ (also known as
‘unconscious bias’) into both litigation and public policy discourse surrounding
discrimination law.”).
142
Gabriel “Jack” Chin et al., Beyond Self-Interest: Asian Pacific Americans Toward
a Community of Justice, A Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4 Asian Pac. Am.
L.J. 129, 133 (1996).
143
Feingold & Lorang, supra note 140, at 221
144
Black, 538 U.S. at 356–57.
145
See supra notes 123–29 and accompanying text; see also Black, 538 U.S. at 388
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In holding the ban on cross burning with intent to
intimidate unconstitutional, the Court ignores Justice Holmes’ familiar aphorism that
‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic.’”) (internal punctuation and citations
omitted).
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understand true threats and fighting words from the perspective of
“reasonable listeners146,” instead of following the ACLU’s guidance,
which urges courts to consider what the speaker intends to communicate
and, in so doing, unjustifiably affords White supremacists the benefit of
the doubt.
Dr. Chris Demaske, who interrogates issues of power associated
with the First Amendment and culturally disempowered groups,
proposes a three-prong doctrinal framework to analyze First
Amendment cases to allow for an analysis of the “historical relationship
between group identity and individual power . . . and the power
embedded between individual speakers.”147 In Demaske’s framework
[i]n place of the traditional focus on whether the regulation in
question is content-neutral or content-based, [the Court would
consider:] (1) the character, nature and scope of the speech
restriction; (2) the historical context of the cultural groups involved
in the speech at issue; and (3) the individual power relations
occurring at the particular speech moment.148
The first prong allows the Court to holistically consider the
government’s reason for censorship or restriction that could allow for
content and viewpoint restrictions, but still recognizes that the character
of the speech—whether content-based or content-neutral—is a
significant consideration.149 Under the second prong, “the Court would
consider the historic context based on culturally constructed group
identity when reviewing whether to restrict speech,” with empirical
psychological and social scientific studies to be “used to determine the
status [and level]150 of a group’s historical disempowerment.”151
See e.g., Matsuda, Considering the Victim’s Story, supra note 7, at 2357 (“The
alternative to recognizing racist speech as qualitatively different because of its
content is to continue to stretch existing first amendment exceptions, such as the
“fighting words” doctrine...”).
147
Chris Demaske, Modern Power and the First Amendment: Reassessing Hate
Speech, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 273, 280 (2004).
148
Id.
149
Id. at 280–81.
150
ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES THE
WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS chs. 2–4 (2002) (outlining “ways in which
historical data could be used to determine the level of disempowerment individuals
may feel based on their group identity.”).
151
See Demaske, supra note 147, at 281–82.
146
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Moreover, Demaske notes that incorporating this prong is consistent
with the majority’s extensive analysis of the history of cross-burning in
Black as a symbol of hate.152 The third prong looks at relational power
dynamics, and “requires a consideration of the power dynamic of the
specific speech situation. For example, does the speech take place on
public or private property? Are the speakers alone or surrounded by
others?”153 A “speech moment” analysis could also take into account,
for instance, whether the public space in which the speech occurs takes
place in a town comprised of a community that is predominantly made
up of the ethnically marginalized, or otherwise marginalized group who
is the target of that speech.154 Demaske’s alternative framework,
therefore, offers a method of exorcising White supremacy from the First
Amendment by allowing state governments to use “historical evidence
and psychological studies to create effective hate-speech regulations
that would not unfairly privilege one side of the debate or drive certain
ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”155
IV.

THE COURT LEGITIMATES WHITE SUPREMACY BY
LEGITIMATING HATE SPEECH.

The Court additionally maintains White supremacy by elevating
cross burning to important racist expression, necessary to political
debate seen vis-à-vis its decision to analyze conduct like cross burning
under the First Amendment; and to then afford such conduct First
Amendment protection.
In Justice Thomas’s powerful dissent in Black, he argues that
cross burning is terrorizing conduct, rather than racist expression, and
therefore does not need to be analyzed under the First Amendment
whatsoever.156 Thomas maintains that his conclusion is supported by
the fact that the Virginia legislature sought to enact a statute that
acknowledged and rectified the State’s own prevailing practice of racial
segregation.157 Moreover, Thomas posits that Virginia, in instituting a
ban on cross burning with intent to intimidate demonstrates:

152

Id. at 281–82.
Id. at 282.
154
Id. at 282–83, 296.
155
Id. at 316.
156
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 394–95 (2003).
157
Id.
153
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[E]ven segregationists understood the difference between
intimidating and terroristic conduct and racist expression. It is
simply beyond belief that, in passing the statute now under
review, the Virginia Legislature was concerned with anything
but penalizing conduct it must have viewed as particularly
vicious. Accordingly, this statute prohibits only conduct, not
expression. And, just as one cannot burn down someone’s house
to make a political point and then seek refuge in the First
Amendment, those who hate cannot terrorize and intimidate to
make their point. In light of my conclusion that the statute here
addresses only conduct, there is no need to analyze it under any
of our First Amendment tests.158
The Court, however, is resolved on ensuring that cross
burning—despite its notoriety as an instrument of terror—receives the
benefit of First Amendment protection because of its apparent
expressive value.159 The Court’s holding in Black is demonstrative of
this point.160
The Court, of course, has used law to suppress the flourishing
of certain ideas through content-based restrictions, even in the face of
First Amendment-based counter-arguments in the past.161 So-called
“low value” speech includes fighting words, commercial advertising;162

158

Id. at 394–95.
Id. at 366 (“[O]ccasionally a person who burns a cross does not intend to express
either a statement of ideology or intimidation. Cross burnings have appeared in
movies such as Mississippi Burning, and in plays such as the stage adaptation of Sir
Walter Scott’s The Lady of the Lake.”).
160
Id. at 366 (“Burning a cross at a political rally would almost certainly be
protected expression.”) (citations omitted).
161
See generally Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 2166, 2228 (2015) (noting that it is widely accepted that the First
Amendment is inapplicable, or applies weakly to “low-value” speech, but
challenging the assumption that such low-value speech has never raised any
constitution concern).
162
See id. at 2182. (“Advertising has been considered a category of low-value speech
since the Court rather summarily held, in Valentine v. Chrestensen in 1942, that the
Constitution’s protections did not apply to this kind of speech.”).
159
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defamation;163 and obscene, or profane speech.164 For various reasons,
the Court has deemed this speech so valueless that it is simply unworthy
of Constitutional protection.165 For instance, in New York v. Ferber, the
Court held, inter alia, that two movies depicting young boys
masturbating was unprotected by the First Amendment, because the
value of permitting the live permanence “of children engaged in lewd
sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.”166 The Court
considers political speech, on the other hand, to be of “high value.”167
However, it is likewise a myth that the Court has never allowed states
to proscribe content-based, political speech. In Gitlow v. People of State
of New York, the Court upheld a New York law that rendered criminal
anarchy a felony, and sustained the conviction of a man who published
and circulated a “Left Wing Manifesto” denouncing capitalism and
supporting communism.168 The Court based its decision on the theory
that a State has the right to self-preservation,169 and that free speech
guarantees may be reasonably limited, for example, by a State that, “in
the exercise of its police power . . . punish[es] those who abuse this
freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt
public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace.”170
That the Court determined the Virginia cross burning statute to
be unconstitutional on the basis that it would create the “unacceptable
risk of the suppression of ideas,”171 thereby illustrates the Court’s
backing of White supremacy as an “idea,” worthy of Constitutional
protection, or at least, that it serves higher than de minimis value to
society. The Black plurality reiterated the bedrock principle embedded
163

See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256 (1952); see also Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (“[L]ibelous utterances are not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech.”).
164
See Roth, 354 U.S. at 481 (“[E]xpressions found in numerous opinions indicate
that this Court has always assumed that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of
speech and press.”).
165
Lakier, supra note 161, at 2228.
166
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982).
167
See Lakier, supra note 161, at 2228.
168
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 656 n.2 (1925) (“The world is in crisis.
Capitalism, the prevailing system of society, is in process of disintegration and
collapse. Humanity can be saved from its last excesses only by the Communist
Revolution.”).
169
Id. at 668.
170
Id. at 667 (citations omitted).
171
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003).
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in our First Amendment jurisprudence, that the “hallmark of the
protection of free speech is to allow ‘free trade in ideas’—even ideas
that the overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or
discomforting.”172 Putting aside the vast evidence that cross burning
instills in minorities a little more than discomfort, the Court’s assertion
here—in the context of cross burning—substantiates racial hatred as
valuable political discourse to society; a minority individual’s identity
in this country is a topic always up for discussion. This principal is
enshrined in other, non-cross burning-related First Amendment cases as
well.173
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, at issue was Ohio’s “Criminal
Syndicalism Act,” which punished those who, generally speaking,
advocated violence as a means of accomplishing political reform.174
Ohio had used the Act to convict the leader of a KKK group, who at a
KKK rally, had shown a video to KKK members.175 Portions of the film
were also later broadcast on local television and on a national
network.176 The film contained derogatory phrases about Black and
Jewish people, stating “[t]his is what we are going to do to the niggers[,]
172

Id. at 358 (citation omitted); see also Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,
4 (1949) (“Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is
to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs
people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at
prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for
acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, is
nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to
produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”) (internal citation omitted).
173
See Matsuda, Considering the Victim’s Story, supra note 7, at 2351 (“What the
American position means in the area of race is that expressions of the ideas of racial
inferiority or racial hatred are protected. Anyone who wants to say that African
Americans and Jews are inferior and deserving of persecution is entitled to. However
loathsome this idea may be, it is still political speech.”).
174
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2923.13) (“The Act punishes persons who ‘advocate or teach the duty,
necessity, or propriety’ of violence ‘as a means of accomplishing industrial or
political reform;’ or who publish or circulate or display any book or paper containing
such advocacy; or who ‘justify’ the commission of violent acts ‘with intent to
exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism;
or who ‘voluntarily assemble’ with a group formed ‘to teach or advocate the
doctrines of criminal syndicalism.’”).
175
Id. at 444.
176
Id. at 445.
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[a] dirty nigger[,] send the Jews back to Israel . . . [s]ave America. Let’s
go back to constitutional betterment. Bury the nigger.”177 In a per
curium opinion, the Court determined the Act was unconstitutional
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it punished mere
advocacy and assembly, as opposed to punishing incitement to
imminent lawless action, which would be constitutional.178 Moreover,
the Court reasoned that failing to distinguish between advocacy and
imminent lawless action “sweeps within its condemnation speech which
our Constitution has immunized from governmental control.”179 The
Court did not elaborate on what speech would fit into this category of
“immunized” speech,180 however, a direct comparison of the previously
discussed Gitlow case181 with Brandenberg yields the conclusion that
the type of political speech in Brandenberg, i.e., hate speech, has more
than minimal value to the Court. What value such hate speech has is
beyond comprehension to many academics,182 but is certainly consistent
with the theory that the Court uses constitutional law to preserve ideas
of White supremacy, insofar as “being a member of a privileged group
is being the . . . subject of all inquiry in which people of color or other
non-privileged groups are the objects.”183
The Court’s commitment to preserving White supremacist
ideological values through its protection of so-determined, “high value”
hate speech is further supported by the Court’s analysis in the more
recent cross burning cases discussed herein.184 In R.A.V., for example,
Justice Scalia wrote that the Ordinance at issue which proscribed
‘fighting words’ that insult, or provoke violence on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender, “[went] even beyond mere content

177

Id. at 446 n.1 (internal punctuation omitted).
Id. at 457.
179
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
180
See Demaske, supra note 147, at 174 (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449)
(“Any statute or law that would restrict speech not producing ‘imminent lawless
action’ would ‘sweep within its condemnation speech which our Constitution has
immunized from government control.’ The Court did not set any additional
parameters of what speech would fit into this category.”).
181
See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
182
See generally MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 7.
183
Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The
Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other - Isms),
1991 DUKE L.J. 397, 402 (1991).
184
Supra Parts II and III.
178
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discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination,”185 the logic being
that proponents of racial equality could argue their points, but White
supremacists would be crippled.186 Scalia contended that “St. Paul has
no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”187
Similarly, the Court, in Black, reasoned that the unconstitutional prima
facie evidence provision of the Virginia statute at issue, denied the
defendants the opportunity to exercise their constitutional right to put
on a defense.188 Therefore, Scalia, in R.A.V., and O’Connor in Black
expressly reaffirm White supremacy by treating it as one side of a
“debate,” which merits airtime. Justice White, in dissent, takes issue
with Scalia’s position, and avers that, “by characterizing fighting words
as a form of ‘debate,’ the majority legitimates hate speech as a form of
public discussion.”189 White additionally observes:
Any contribution of [R.A.V.’s] holding to First Amendment
jurisprudence is surely a negative one, since it necessarily
signals that expressions of violence, such as the message of
intimidation and racial hatred conveyed by burning a cross on
someone’s lawn, are of sufficient value to outweigh the social
interest in order and morality that has traditionally placed such
fighting words outside the First Amendment.190
Justice White, in one sentence, presents the theory that the Court
intends to keep messages of racial hatred within the reach of the First
Amendment, because the value of their content outweighs the public
interest in order and morality. The Court values racial hatred so much,
that Americans should be able to trade ideas freely about whether the

185

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
See id. (“Displays containing some words—odious racial epithets, for example—
would be prohibited to proponents of all views. But ‘fighting words’ that do not
themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or gender—aspersions upon a person's
mother, for example—would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of those
arguing in favor of racial, color, etc., tolerance and equality, but could not be used by
those speakers’ opponents.”).
187
Id. at 392.
188
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 345 (2003).
189
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 402 (White, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
190
Id.
186
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White race is supreme, with First Amendment protection, and without
undue interference from federal or state authorities.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court and the ACLU sincerely believe that their
content-neutral, colorblind, and laissez-faire approach to the regulation
of hate speech under the First Amendment protects the free-flow of
ideas. This article has challenged this popular viewpoint by first
exposing the lack of First Amendment absolutism,191 and second, by
presenting the distinct ways in which the Court, through its cross
burning cases, has deliberately shaped the contours of First Amendment
jurisprudence in a manner that maintains White supremacy.192 The
Court does this by insisting that cross burning has redeeming political
value by refusing to recognize it as non-speech fighting words; and by
defining true threats by the speaker’s intent rather than what a
reasonable minority individual would understand to be threatening.193
Finally, the Court legitimates White supremacy by even choosing to
afford cross burning First Amendment protection. That is, the Court
could instead create a rule that cross burning encourages a debate about
whether a minority has the right to exist, and, that such a debate is
actually low value speech, undeserving of any First Amendment
analysis.194
Although the ACLU’s abstract argument that only the broadest
content-neutral protection of speech will provide the best hope for
eliminating racial hatred may be compelling, in reality, it is a post-racial
position that ignores and forgets our nation’s gruesome history of
slavery and state-sanctioned segregation. Former ACLU president Ira
Glasser believed that the problem is not speech, but bigotry and
prejudice, and only a liberal construction of the First Amendment will
necessarily allow for the type of discourse that will combat

191

See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
193
See supra Part III; see also Matsuda, Considering the Victim’s Story, supra note
7, at 2357 (“The alternative to recognizing racist speech as qualitatively different
because of its content is to continue to stretch existing first amendment exceptions,
such as the “fighting words” doctrine and the “content/conduct” distinction.”).
194
See supra Part IV.
192
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discrimination.195 However, to make sense of the ACLU’s logic, an
ahistorical understanding of cross burning is required. As Professor
Obasogie writes, the “role of context and history in colorblindness
discourses is largely sidestepped and undertheorized in favor of flat,
acontextual claims that race consciousness is race consciousness is race
consciousness; the Klansman and the affirmative action supporter suffer
from the same folly of paying too much attention to race.”196 Of course,
this ideological stance, “denies the ongoing significance of racial
subordination and White racial privilege.”197 Indeed, so too does the
Court and ACLU’s colorblind position that all ideas, including notions
of White supremacy, are of equal value to society.198
Cross burning is valueless, like other threats and words that by
their very utterance inflict injury; for the Court and the ACLU to find
otherwise maintains a system of law that places White privilege above
the security and dignity of minorities.199 The danger of forgetting and
unknowing the historical context of cross burning,200 and allowing such
terrorism to thrive as a protected form of expression, is that minority
victims’ right to protection from White terrorism is undermined. If we

195

See generally Ira Glasser, Introduction to HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR. ET AL.,
SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES (1995) (arguing that dialogue, not censorship, might better lead us to
racial justice).
196
See OBASOGIE, supra note 2, at 172.
197
Id.
198
See Powell, supra note 6, at 849 (“Content neutrality and colorblindness are
reinforcing doctrinal concepts. Both types of ‘blindness’ (to content under the First
Amendment) and to race (under the Fourteenth Amendment) lead to the same result.
The First Amendment’s prohibition against content-based discrimination by the
state, as applied to hate speech and colorblind constitutionalism both serve to
preserve the status quo.”).
199
See, e.g., DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 8 (arguing that hate speech left
unregulated harms both society and the individuals who are targeted by the speech
precisely because it devalues targeted individuals and promotes their unequal
treatment); Matsuda, Considering the Victim’s Story, supra note 7, at 2378 (“[T]he
failure to provide a legal response limiting hate propaganda elevates liberty interests
of racists over liberty interests of targets.”).
200
See Matsuda, Considering the Victim’s Story, supra note 7, at 2368 (calling
generally for an end to “unknowing” our history of racism, and that, “[r]ather than
looking to the neutral, objective, unknowing, and ahistorical reasonable person, we
should look to the victim-group members to tell us whether the harm is real harm to
real people.”).
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are to take the goals of the Reconstruction Amendments201 seriously,202
such an ahistorical, colorblind view of the First Amendment cannot and
should not persist.

201

See Scott Allen Carlson, The Gerrymandering of the Reconstruction Amendments
and Strict Scrutiny: The Supreme Court’s Unwarranted Intrusion into the Political
Thicket, 23 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 71, 77 (1997) (“Prior to the passage of the
Fifteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment was promulgated by the ThirtyNinth Congress in 1868 with the purpose of securing racial equalization and
eliminating racially discriminatory practices.”).
202
See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 125 (1992) (criticizing the R.A.V. Court for
“seem[ing] to have forgotten that it is a Constitution they are expounding, and that
the Constitution contains not just the First Amendment, but the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments as well.”).

